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Abstract
Emerging country governments increasingly issue local currency denominated bonds
and foreign investors have been increasing their holdings of these assets. By issuing debt
denominated in local currency, emerging country governments eliminate exchange rate
risk. The growing stock of local currency government debt in the financial portfolios of
foreign investors increases their diversification and exposure to fast growing economies.
In this paper, we highlight some of the risks associated to this recent trend. First, we
adopt the CoV aR risk-measure to estimate the vulnerability of individual countries to
systemic risk in the market for local currency government debt. Second, we show that
our country-level estimates of vulnerability increase with the share of local currency
debt held by foreign investors. A version of the old adage ”When New York sneezes,
London catches a cold,” used often to describe the relationship between the stock
markets in these two cities, still applies between individual emerging countries and the
aggregate market for local currency government debt.
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1 Introduction
Governments in emerging countries increasingly issue bonds denominated in local currency
and the share of this market held by foreign investors has been progressively growing. By
issuing debt denominated in local currency, governments curb the exposure to exchange
rate risk which, instead, is typical of debt denominated in foreign currency (for example,
Eichengreen et al. (2003) and Margolin (2007) discuss the risks and costs of issuing debt
denominated in foreign currency, mostly the U.S. dollar). By investing in local currency
denominated bonds, foreign investors increase the diversification of their financial portfolios
and gain exposure to fast growing economies. In this paper, we highlight some of the risks
associated to this recent trend. In fact, we show that a country’s vulnerability to systemic
risk increases with the share of local currency denominated government debt held by foreign
investors1. In some sense, a version of the old adage ”When New York sneezes, London
catches a cold”, used often to describe the stock markets in these two cities, applies between
emerging countries and the aggregate market for local currency denominated government
debt.
The stock of debt issued by governments in emerging countries and denominated in local
currency increased by a factor of 4 since 2002 and it is currently worth over 4 trillion U.S.
dollars. On the contrary, over the same period, the stock of debt denominated in foreign
currency was never above the 1 U.S. dollar trillion mark (see figure 1). The growing stock of
government debt denominated in local currency shows that emerging countries are breaking
free from the so called ”original sin” (i.e, the difficulty governments face when borrowing
abroad in their own, or local, currency). Foreign investors are also progressively becoming
more relevant players in the market for local currency government debt. In the bottom panel
of figure 1, we report the foreign holdings of aggregate debt issued by emerging country
governments, as a percentage of their aggregate GDP. While the foreign holdings of debt
denominated in local currency have been progressively increasing, reaching approximately 3
percent in 2016, the holdings of debt denominated in foreign currency have been declining
and were approximately 2 percent in 2016. In this paper, we argue that the increased share
of local currency debt held by foreigners is a potential source of transmission of shocks
both globally, and across different emerging markets. Intuitively, the larger the share held
by foreign investors, the stronger the impact of shocks to their marginal utilities on the
price of government bonds denominated in local currency. On the other hand, when foreign
1The literature has yet to find a consensus definition of ”systemic risk”. In what follows, we distinguish
systemic from systematic or aggregate risk and define systemic risk as a tail-event risk, or the risk of financial
instability ”so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic
growth and welfare suffer materially” (ECB, 2010; Bisias et al., 2012; Billio et al., 2012).
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holdings are small, idiosyncratic country-specific shocks are the main source of variability for
local currency bond prices. Borri and Verdelhan (2011) consider the market for government
debt issued by emerging countries and denominated in foreign currency, traditionally held
mostly by foreign investors, and find that global common factors explain a large share of the
variability of excess returns. Looking at equity markets, Kaminsky et al. (2004) show that
active trading strategies of equity mutual fund investors, like momentum strategies, spread
contagion across emerging markets and Beirne et al. (2013) find volatility spillovers from
mature to emerging stock markets. On the contrary, the large cross-country differences in
the shares of local currency government debt held by foreigners could also generate differences
in the transmission of common global shocks across emerging countries2. Borri and Shakhnov
(2017) describe this intuition more formally in a model with two partially segmented markets
for local and foreign currency denominated government debt and show that the larger the
share of foreign investors, investing in both markets, the higher the degree of integration
across the two markets and globally. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
that studies tail-risk contagion in the market for local currency denominated government
debt for emerging countries.
In this paper we focus on contagion of tail-events. In particular, we estimate the vul-
nerability to systemic risk in the market for local currency denominated debt with the
reduced-form risk-measure CoV aR, or conditional value-at-risk, first proposed by Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2016)3. Systemic risk measures the increase in tail comovement that can
arise due to the spreading of distress across different financial markets. CoV aR is a measure
of risk conditional upon an adverse shock, where risk is the standard value-at-risk (VaR).
VaR measures risk in terms of returns at a given probability: for example, a VaR of -10%
at the 1% confidence level indicates that there is a probability of 1% of a return that is
lower or equal to -10%. Adrian and Brunnermeier use CoVaR to estimate the systemic risk
of financial institutions using a combination of market and balance sheet data. Fong and
Wong (2012) adopt a similar approach to estimate bi-lateral systemic risk in the Eurozone
using sovereign CDS data. In this paper, we find that emerging countries differ substantially
in terms of their vulnerability to systemic risk in the market for government debt denom-
inated in local currency. We try to explain the determinants of these differences and find
that countries with a larger share of local currency debt held by foreign investors are more
2See table 2 and the discussion in section 2 for stylized facts about foreign holdings of local currency
government debt across countries.
3There exist several alternative measures of systemic risk. Many of them rely on CDS data. For exam-
ple, Acharya et al. (2012) focus on high-frequency marginal expected shortfall; Acharya et al. (2017) and
Brownlees and Engle (2016) develop SRISK, which measures capital shortfall conditional on market stress;
Billio et al. (2012) builds a risk-measure based on Granger causality across institutions.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Emerging Countries’ Government Debt
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Notes: The top panel of this figure reports aggregate emerging countries’ government debt in billions of U.S. dollars. The blue
line denotes debt denominated in local currency; the dashed red line debt denominated in foreign currency. Local currency
debt is converted in U.S. dollars using the market exchange rate. The bottom panel of this figure reports the aggregate foreign
investors holdings of emerging countries’ government debt denominated in local currency (blue line) and foreign currency
(dashed red line). The aggregate holdings are reported as share of aggregate emerging countries GDP. Data are from Arslanalp
and Tsuda (2014) for the period 2002:Q1–2016:Q2 at quarterly frequency.
vulnerable suggesting that increasing integration of capital markets could exacerbate the
risk of contagion. These results have important implications for governments and financial
institutions both in terms of optimal currency denomination of debt and risk management,
and in terms of provisions to curb the volatility of foreign investors’ portfolio allocations (see
for example Ostry et al. (2012)). In addition, these results are valuable for foreign investors
to correctly measure the risk and diversification of their financial portfolios, as also argued
by Das and Uppal (2004) for international equity portfolios.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first studies contagion in
emerging markets. Contagion is usually defined as correlation between markets in excess of
what would be implied by economic fundamentals (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003a). Most of the
research in this strand of the literature has focused on equity markets, and on large financial
and economic crises, like the 1994 Mexican and the 1997 Asian crises. Calvo and Mendoza
(2000) is a classic model in which globalization may promote contagion by weakening in-
centives for gathering costly information. Edwards and Susmel (2001) find strong evidence
of stock market volatility co-movements across countries. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue
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that it is important to correctly account for heteroskedasticity when measuring contagion
with correlation coefficients and find that, while there is little evidence of contagion during
major financial crises, conversely, there exists a high level of market comovements in normal
times. Bekaert and Harvey (2003b) estimate contagion as correlation across residuals of a
two-factor model with time-varying betas applied to stock returns in three different regions
– Europe, South-East Asia, and Latin America – and find no evidence of contagion from
the Mexican crisis, but find evidence of contagion during the Asian crisis. Tai (2007) finds
that Asian emerging stock markets become integrated into world capital markets since their
official liberalization, and that there is evidence of contagion from stock to foreign exchange
markets during the Asian crisis. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016) study systemic risk for firms in
emerging markets that borrow in foreign currency and that have, typically, income in local
currency and argue for regulatory measures to limit currency mismatches. The second strand
of the literature studies the growing market for local currency sovereign and corporate debt
in emerging countries. Peiris (2010) finds that higher foreign participation reduces long-term
local currency government bond yields and volatility in a group of 10 emerging countries for
the period 2000–2009. Miyajima et al. (2015) argue that local factors, rather than global
factors, are the main drivers of local currency bond yields. Du and Schreger (2016) construct
a measure of local currency credit spread as the yield difference between the rate on local
currency bonds and a synthetic local currency risk-free rate computed using cross-currency
swaps. The authors find that the local currency spread is positive, and sizable and, contrary
to foreign currency credit spreads, depend more on domestic, than global, conditions and
have lower means and cross-country correlations. Hale et al. (2016) look at individual pri-
vate, rather than sovereign, bonds issued in local currency. Finally, this paper is also related
to the recent literature that looks at the fast growing market for European countries’ gov-
ernment debt after the introduction of the Euro and at the onset of the European sovereign
debt crisis and finds that European-wide common factors became more important after the
adoption of the common currency. For example, Ang and Longstaff (2013) find that there
is more systematic risk among European debt markets than for U.S. debt markets at the
state level. Abad et al. (2010) find that European government bond markets in the period
1999–2008 are only partially integrated and that domestic factors explain bond returns. In
addition, they find that non-EMU European countries are more influenced by world risk
factors, and less by domestic or EMU-wide factors. Geyer et al. (2004) look at European
government bonds in the period 1999-2004 and find that most of the variation in spreads is
due to common factors that are linked to European corporate and swap spreads. Pagano
and Von Thadden (2004) and Go´mez-Puig (2008) find that with the introduction of the
Euro, international risk factors became less important while the importance of local factors
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increased4.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 introduces our conditional measure of vulnerability to systematic risk. Section 4 presents
the results of our estimations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
In this paper we use CoV aR to measure the exposure to systemic risk in the aggregate
market for local currency government debt issued by emerging countries. As explained in
greater details in section 3, in the estimation of CoV aR we include state variables to capture
time-variation in risk exposure to global risk factors. First, we collect daily frequency total
return indices of local currency denominated debt issued by emerging governments from J.P.
Morgan through Datastream. In particular, we use the J.P. Morgan GBI-EM indices for
local currency denominated debt. The JPM GBI-EM indices track local currency bonds
issued by emerging market governments and are based on local currency, and not U.S.
dollar, values, and include individual bonds that meet specified criteria in terms of liquidity
and reliability of market prices. The countries in our sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru`, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey. The longest sample is 31/12/2002–30/6/2016, but the size
of the cross-section progressively increases as more countries enter the indices. In particular,
there are 7 countries at the beginning of the sample and 17 at the end. We build daily
returns as log differences in the total return price indices. J.P. Morgan also publishes two
additional families of emerging market government bond indices. The classic EMBI indices,
formed in the early 1990s after the issuance of the first Brady bonds, collect foreign currency
denominated debt (mostly U.S. dollar denominated). The ELMI+ indices also collect local
currency denominated debt, but for the money market and therefore have a very short
duration (on average, 0.15 years against the average maturity of 5 years at the end of 2015 for
the bonds included in the J.P. Morgan GBI-EM indices). In this paper, we focus exclusively
on the J.P. Morgan GBI-EM local currency denominated bond indices. For the countries in
the sample, we additionally collect exchange rate data with respect to the U.S. dollar from
Reuters and Barclays through Datastream (exchange rates are in units of foreign currency
per U.S. dollar). In addition, we collect daily frequency total return indices corresponding
to variables commonly used to capture global risk factors relevant for emerging countries
and that we use in the conditional estimation of CoV aR. In particular, we collect data for
4See also De Grauwe and Ji (2012); Battistini et al. (2013); Black et al. (2016); Reboredo and Ugolini
(2015).
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the S&P500 Composite and the CBOE VIX to capture the state of the global economy and
investors’ risk aversion and sentiment; the Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Corporate
Bond Index to capture global default risk; and the Bloomberg Commodity Index to capture
the values of a broad basket of commodities, as these are an important source of export
revenues for emerging countries. Finally, we collect data on a set of potential determinants
of the differences in vulnerability to systemic risk across countries. In particular, we collect
quarterly data on the shares of local currency and total government debt held by foreigners,
nominal GDP, and shares of local currency and total government debt over GDP from
Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) for the period 2002:Q1–2016:Q2; annual values of the KAOPEN
index by Chinn and Ito (2006) measuring a country’s degree of capital account openness;
sovereign credit ratings on local currency debt from Standard & Poor’s5. These variables
capture both the size and the risk of the local currency debt markets, as well as how relevant
are foreign investors. Section 4 discusses at greater length why these variables are good
candidates to explain differences in vulnerability to systemic risk across the countries in our
sample.
We report in tables 1 to 3 descriptive statistics of the data. In panel A and C of table 1
we report mean, standard deviation, skeweness, minimum and maximum values for the log
returns on the local currency bond indices and the state variables used in the conditional
estimation of ∆CoV aR of section 4. The mean daily returns in local currency are all positive
and range from 0.011% for Chile to 0.051% percent for Turkey. Also volatilities and skew-
ness differ substantially across countries: for example, in the period 31/12/2002–30/6/2016,
Argentina registered a minimum daily return of -14% and a maximum daily return of 10%.
Brazil, Indonesia and Russia also experienced large swings in the prices of their local currency
government bonds. Since foreign investors buying bonds denominated in local currency also
face exchange rate risk unless this is hedged, in the empirical estimation of ∆CoV aR we
convert the returns on the local currency bond indices in U.S. dollars (see section 4). In
panel B we report the mean and standard deviation of the daily log changes in the exchange
rates with respect to the U.S. dollar. For most countries, the mean exchange rate growth
is positive indicating a depreciation of the local currency with respect to the U.S. dollar
over the sample considered. Therefore, from the perspective of unhedged foreign investors,
the returns on the investment in local currency bonds are reduced once converted back into
dollars. In table 2 we report descriptive statistics on the shares of local currency, and total,
5The Chinn-Ito KAOPEN index is a number in between 0 and 1 and it is equal to 1 for the U.S. For
additional details you can refer to Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and Chinn and Ito (2006). Standard & Poor’s
assigns letter credit ratings on local currency government debt (i.e., AAA corresponds to the highest credit
worthiness, and SD to selective default). We convert the letter ratings in a numerical ordering, with a lower
number corresponding to a higher credit worthiness.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: financial data
Panel A: local currency returns Panel B: exchange rates
mean (%) std.dev (%) skew min (%) max (%) mean (%) std.dev (%)
Argentina 0.027 1.183 -1.185 -14.063 10.213 0.042 0.943
Brazil 0.048 0.316 -8.546 -9.626 2.174 -0.003 0.924
Chile 0.011 0.124 -0.127 -0.799 0.987 -0.002 0.620
China 0.015 0.213 -1.865 -3.968 3.434 -0.006 0.108
Colombia 0.038 0.292 -0.798 -2.927 2.355 0.001 0.700
Hungary 0.030 0.407 -0.983 -5.218 3.737 0.007 0.984
India 0.026 0.304 -0.756 -4.804 3.719 0.010 0.426
Indonesia 0.048 0.692 -1.007 -11.121 8.912 0.011 0.486
Malaysia 0.015 0.142 -0.558 -1.426 1.322 0.001 0.394
Mexico 0.034 0.325 0.518 -2.563 4.061 0.016 0.717
Peru 0.027 0.423 1.973 -3.209 7.012 -0.002 0.295
Philippines 0.027 0.433 -0.814 -3.806 2.577 -0.004 0.331
Poland 0.023 0.195 -0.841 -2.458 1.348 0.001 0.913
Romania 0.027 0.145 -0.737 -0.746 0.565 0.005 0.786
Russia 0.030 0.539 -2.007 -10.369 8.320 0.020 0.851
South Africa 0.034 0.399 -1.331 -6.516 2.819 0.015 1.079
Turkey 0.051 0.372 -0.496 -3.196 2.591 0.016 0.825
Mean 0.030 0.372 -1.151 -5.107 3.891 0.008 0.825
Panel C: state variables
S&P 500 0.032 1.186 -0.318 -9.460 10.958
CBOE VIX -0.016 6.725 0.729 -35.059 49.601
U.S. Corporate 0.016 0.648 -0.546 -5.674 4.100
Commodities -0.002 1.085 -0.230 -6.401 5.650
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the financial data described in section 2. Panel A reports mean, standard
deviation, skewness, minimum and maximum for the log returns on local currency government bond indices. Panel B reports
mean and standard deviation for the log changes of the exchange rates with respect to the U.S. dollar (exchange rates are
expressed in units of local currency per U.S. dollar). Panel C reports mean, standard deviation, skewness, minimum and
maximum for the log returns on the state variables used in the conditional estimation of CoV aR described in section 4. The
sample is 31/12/2002–30/6/2016. Data are from Datastream at daily frequency.
government debt held by foreigners, and on the local currency and total government debt
over GDP. On average, foreign investors held 15 percent of emerging country governments’
debt denominated in local currency, and 30 percent of the total (i.e., local and foreign cur-
rency denominated). However, there exist both large differences across countries, and over
time within a country. Foreign investors held only a small fraction of the local currency
denominated debt issued by China and India (0.7% and 1.4% on average, respectively). On
the contrary, foreign investors held a large fraction of local currency debt issued by countries
like Hungary (average 30.2%, maximum 43.6%), Peru` (average 32.0%, maximum 56.6%), Ar-
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gentina (average 10.6%, maximum 40.3%), or Indonesia (average 22.8%, maximum 39.6%).
Note that most of the government debt issued by emerging countries is denominated in local
currency. On average, government debt in local currency was about 22 percent of GDP,
while the total debt (i.e., local and foreign currency denominated) was only a bit larger
and approximately equal to 30 percent. Finally, in table 3 we report additional descriptive
statistics for the variables used in the panel estimation of section 4. In particular, we report
mean, minimum and maximum value for GDP, converted in U.S. dollar, the Chinn-Ito index
and S&P sovereign credit ratings on local currency denominated government debt. In our
sample, countries differ in terms of openness and default risk. With respect to openness,
Chile, Peru` and Romania are the most open countries in the sample, while China, South
Africa and India the closest. With respect to default risk, China, Malaysia, Poland and
South Africa are the safest countries, while Argentina, Indonesia and Turkey the riskiest.
3 Model
In this paper we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and estimate CoV aR with quantile
regressions (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978; Koenker, 2005). This is not the only possible
estimation technique. For example, CoV aR can also be estimated with generalized autore-
gressive heteroskedasticy (GARCH) models. We leave the interested reader to the detailed
discussion in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) for further details and proofs. We denote
with ri the log returns on the local currency government bond index of country i = 1, . . . , N ,
and with
rm =
N∑
j=1
ωjr
j
the log returns on the (value-weighted) aggregate market for local currency government
debt issued by emerging countries, where ωj are weights that sum up to 1. Define with
V aRmq the maximum market return at a confidence level of 1− q
Pr(rm ≤ V aRmq ) = q. (1)
Intuitively, V aRm (i.e., the value-at-risk) corresponds to the maximum return in a bad
state of the world, i.e., in a situation of aggregate distress for emerging countries. We define
CoV aR
i|m
q as the V aR of country i conditional upon the aggregate market m being in a
state of distress (i.e., being at V aRmq )
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Pr(ri ≤ CoV aRi|mq | rm = V aRmq ) = q (2)
In order to estimate the conditional risk we use the following quantile regression
rit+1 = β
i|m
0,q + β
i|m
1,q r
m
t+1 +
K∑
k=1
γ
i|m
k,q r
k
t + 
i|m
t+1, (3)
where rk are the lagged returns on a set of common factors that we use as conditioning
variables6. The coefficient β
i|m
1,q measures how vulnerable country i is with respect to a state
of distress of the aggregate market for local currency government debt. CoV aR is then
obtained as fitted value of the quantile regression (3)
CoV aR
i|rm=V aRmq
q = βˆ
i|m
0,q + βˆ
i|m
1,q V aR
m
q +
K∑
k=1
γˆ
i|m
k,q r˜
k, (4)
where the values of the common factors r˜k in (4) are those on the dates when V aRmq is
observed7. We measure the vulnerability of country i to systemic risk in the local currency
government debt market with ∆CoV aR
i|m
q
∆CoV aRi|mq = CoV aR
i|rm=V aRmq
q − CoV aRi|rm=V aRm0.5q . (5)
∆CoV aR measures the difference between the CoV aR of country i conditional on a state of
distress in the aggregate market for local currency government debt and the median state
(i.e., q = 0.5%). Therefore, the larger (in absolute value) the ∆CoV aR, the higher the
vulnerability of country i to systemic risk. In this paper, we use ∆CoV aR as a measure
of vulnerability of individual countries to aggregate tail-risk. On the contrary, Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2016) use ∆CoV aR to measure the systemic risk of individual financial insti-
tutions, i.e., the vulnerability of the entire financial market with respect to a state of distress
of a single financial institution.
6In the estimation of the quantile regression (3) for country i, we exclude the country’s i returns from
the computation of the aggregate market return rm. In the empirical estimation, the weights ωj correspond
to the relative GDP of country j. An alternative is to weigh returns by the relative stock of local currency
government debt. Results with these alternative weights are similar to those obtained by GDP-weighting
and are available upon request.
7Following the definition in equation (1), we estimate V aRmq as the q-quantile of the returns on the
aggregate market.
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4 Estimation Results
We estimate the conditional ∆CoV aRiq for country i and confidence level 1− q at quarterly
intervals over 1-year rolling windows of daily returns data. We set the confidence level 1− q
adopting the standard value q = 1%, while in the appendix we show that results are robust
to a higher value of q = 5%. We convert returns on local currency denominated debt in a
common currency using the local currency exchange rates with respect to the U.S. dollar8.
Denote with ri,?t+1 the log returns on the local currency bond index for country i, expressed
in local currency, and with sit the log of the exchange rate expressed in units of country i
local currency per U.S. dollar. Then
rit+1 = r
i,?
t+1 −∆sit+1, (6)
where ri are the returns in dollars. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we include in
the estimation state variables that capture time variation in the conditional moments of asset
returns. Including the state variables is important to disentangle the vulnerability of each
country with respect to tail-risk in the market for local currency government debt from the
more general vulnerability with respect to global factors. The set of state variables includes:
the returns on the US equity market, proxied by the S&P500; the log changes in the CBOE
VIX; the returns on a broad US corporate bond index; and the returns on a broad index
for the commodity market. Note that the state variables are not aggregate risk factors (in
fact, they are lagged), but rather variables that condition the mean and the volatility of the
∆CoV aRiq. Figure 2 plots the averages of the quarterly estimates of the ∆CoV aR, while
figure 3 the complete time-series. Argentina is the most vulnerable country, with an average
∆CoV aR1% of about -5.7%. This means that, in a situation of particular distress in the
aggregate market for local currency government debt, we should expect a maximum return,
at the 99% percent confidence level, on local currency Argentinian bonds, of -5.7%, after
controlling for global state variables. South Africa, Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Brazil have
all ∆CoV aR1% smaller than -4%. On the contrary, China is the less vulnerable country, with
a ∆CoV aR1% larger than -1%. In table 4 we report the averages of the quarterly estimates
from equation (4) together with standard errors computed by bootstrap. Note that even
though standard errors are large, the quarterly estimates are mostly negative as can be seen
in figure 3. Table 4 also reports the averages of all the estimated coefficients from equation
(4). The key parameter is β
i|m
V aRm : the larger the value the more vulnerable is a country to
8In the appendix, we show that our results extend to returns on local currency bonds denominated in
local currency, as opposed to the U.S. dollar. Brusa et al. (2014) show evidence that foreign investors are
compensated for bearing currency risk when investing in local equity markets.
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tail-risk in the aggregate market for local currency government debt.
Figure 2: Quarterly ∆CoV aR 1% (averages)
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Notes: This figure plots the averages of the quarterly estimates of the ∆CoV aR1% for all the countries in the sample using
returns on the local currency bond indices converted in U.S. dollars. Countries are sorted, from left to right, in order of smaller
∆CoV aR. The sample period is 31/12/2003–30/06/2016, or the longest available for countries included in the J.P. Morgan
indices at a later date. The ∆CoV aR are estimated using as conditioning variables the returns on the S&P500, a U.S. corporate
bond index, the CBOE VIX, and a commodity index. Data are from Datastream.
We next use a panel estimation to investigate the determinants of the time-varying coun-
try vulnerability to systemic risk in the aggregate local currency government debt market.
In particular, we are interested in the relationship between countries’ vulnerability, as mea-
sured by their quarterly ∆CoV aRiq, and the quarterly shares of local currency debt held
by foreign investors. The assumption we test is whether countries with a larger share of
local currency government debt held by foreign investors are more vulnerable, for example
because of their common exposure to changes in foreign investors’ views and portfolio allo-
cations (for example, Aggarwal et al. (1999); Chari and Kehoe (2003)). The sample period
is 2003:Q1–2016:Q3, but the panel is unbalanced as some countries are included in the J.P.
Morgan indices at a later date. Results are reported in table 5, where each column corre-
sponds to a different specification of the estimation equation, and standard errors are always
robust and clustered at the country level, in order to account for possible auto-correlation
and heteroskedasticity of the residuals. In the first column, the only explanatory variables
are the foreign holdings of local currency government debt and we include a time fixed effect
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Figure 3: Quarterly ∆CoV aR 1%
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Notes: This figure plots the quarterly estimates of the ∆CoV aR1% for all the countries in the sample using returns on the
local currency bond indices converted in U.S. dollars. The sample period is 31/12/2003–30/06/2016, or the longest available
for countries included in the J.P. Morgan indices at a later date. The ∆CoV aR are estimated using as conditioning variables
the returns on the S&P500, a U.S. corporate bond index, the CBOE VIX, and a commodity index. Data are from Datastream.
to control for common factors across countries that changed over time (e.g., changes in finan-
cial regulation in developed markets; market entry by new investors like hedge funds; global
interest rates; etc.). The estimated coefficient is negative and statically significant at the 1
percent level. Note that the coefficient is also significant from an economic point of view:
in fact, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of local currency debt held by foreigners
is associated with a decrease in the quarterly ∆CoV aRiq by approximately 4.4 percentage
points. In the second column we add a country fixed effect to account for county-level char-
acteristics that are constant over the sample (e.g., reputation, quality of the institutions,
default history, etc.). Including the fixed effects increases the size (in absolute value) of the
coefficient attached to the share of local currency debt held by foreigners which is now equal
to approximately -6 percent. In columns 4 to 5 we experiment adding additional explanatory
variables. We start by including the log of the GDP (to proxy for the size of the economies),
the ratios between total and local currency debt and GDP, and the foreign holdings of total
government debt. While these coefficients are not statistically significant, our estimate for
the impact of the share of local currency government debt held by foreign investors increase
in absolute value and remains significant (now at the 10 percent confidence level). We then
13
include the Chinn-Ito KAOPEN index, measuring a country’s degree of capital account open-
ness. A higher index number corresponds to a more open and integrated economy. Also for
this additional variable, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant with no effect
on our dependent variable. In column 5 we include country credit ratings on sovereign debt
denominated in local currency by Standard&Poor’s. Credit ratings are supposed to capture
the risk of default of an issuer, but are updated infrequently and, therefore, are not suited
to explain a high frequency measure of risk. In fact, according to our results, the coefficient
on the credit ratings is not statistically significant. In this case, the point estimate for the
foreign holdings of local currency debt does not change, but the coefficient is now significant
only at the 13% confidence level. Note how in column 5 the number of observations drops
by about 20 percent because of credit ratings data availability. In the separate appendix we
show that these results are robust to a higher level for q = 5%, and to using directly returns
expressed in local currency, as opposed to converting them into U.S. dollars.
5 Conclusions
Emerging countries increasingly issue government bonds denominated in local currency and
foreign investors’ share of this market has been progressively growing. By issuing debt in local
currency, emerging country governments can eliminate exchange rate risk which, instead, is
typical of debt denominated in foreign currency. By investing in local currency denominated
debt, foreign investors can increase the diversification of their financial portfolios and gain
exposure to fast growing economies. However, foreign investors could act as a channel
of transmission of shocks, globally and across emerging markets. For example, following
an increase in the interest rate in developed markets foreign investors might take their
savings out of emerging countries’ government debt causing bond prices to drop. In this
paper we focus on contagion of tail risk. First, we estimate the vulnerability of emerging
countries to systemic risk in the market for local currency government debt using the reduced-
form risk measure CoV aR developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). We estimate
CoV aR using conditional quantile regressions and controlling for global state variables. We
find that countries’ vulnerability is time-varying and that there exist large cross-countries
differences. Second, we find that the share of local currency debt held by foreign investors
positively affects the vulnerability of individual countries to systemic risk in the market for
local currency government debt. These results have interesting implications for governments
and financial institutions both in terms of optimal currency denomination of debt and risk
management, and in terms of provisions to curb the volatility of foreign investors’ portfolio
allocations, like capital controls or taxes aimed at increasing the cost of sudden capital
14
outflows. In addition, these results are important for foreign investors to correctly measure
the risk and diversification of their financial portfolios. We leave for future research an
in-depth analysis of the policy implications of these results.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: additional macro data
GDP (in USD billions) Chinn-Ito S&P Rating
mean min max mean min max mean min max
Argentina 373.2 154.6 585.5 0.2 0.0 0.4 16.2 14 23
Brazil 1704.7 588.8 2644.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 11.5 11 13
Chile 196.2 86.5 277.2 0.9 0.7 1.0 3.0 3 3
China 6073.8 1717.3 10869.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.8 6 8
Colombia 253.4 104.5 391.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 7.9 6 9
Hungary 126.8 96.5 177.5 1.0 0.8 1.0 7.4 5 8
India 1382.5 624.5 2056.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 10.6 9 11
Indonesia 611.4 225.2 908.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 13.2 11 16
Malaysia 234.5 113.1 333.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 5.8 5 6
Mexico 1054.1 746.3 1318.2 0.7 0.4 0.7 7.1 6 8
Peru 137.6 60.8 201.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 10.4 10 11
Philippines 191.9 82.8 294.5 0.4 0.2 0.4 9.5 8 11
Poland 437.6 223.0 585.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 6.6 5 7
Romania 156.6 62.2 203.4 0.9 0.4 1.0 10.5 9 15
Russia 1398.3 488.8 2205.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 9.6 7 15
South Africa 320.2 223.1 439.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 6.8 5 8
Turkey 637.7 336.7 796.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 13.3 12 16
Mean 899.4 349.1 1428.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 9.2 8 11
Notes: This table reports mean, min and max values for GDP (converted in U.S. dollars), the Chinn-Ito KAOPEN index,
and the S&P sovereign credit ratings for local currency debt. The Chinn-Ito KAOPEN index is a number in between 0 and 1
and it is equal to 1 for the U.S. Standard & Poor’s assigns letter credit ratings on local currency government debt (i.e., AAA
corresponds to the highest credit worthiness, and SD to selective default). We convert the letter ratings in a numerical ordering,
with a lower number corresponding to a higher credit worthiness. The sample is 31/12/2002–30/6/2016, with the exception of
the Chinn-Ito index data that ends on 31/12/2014. GDP data are from Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) at quarterly frequency;
the Chinn-Ito index is annual and from Chinn and Ito (2006); S&P credit ratings are from Datastream.
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Table 4: Coefficient Estimates Quarterly ∆CoV aR 1%
∆CoV aR1% β
i|m
V aRm γ
i|m
S&P500 γ
i|m
V IX γ
i|m
CORP γ
i|m
COMM
Argentina -0.057 15.792 0.406 0.092 0.006 0.171
[ 0.036 ] [ 9.873 ] [ 0.606 ] [ 0.097 ] [ 0.481 ] [ 0.380 ]
Brazil -0.039 8.021 0.251 0.011 -0.085 0.021
[ 0.022 ] [ 5.932 ] [ 0.376 ] [ 0.051 ] [ 0.248 ] [ 0.176 ]
Chile -0.015 2.523 0.202 0.020 0.152 0.233
[ 0.016 ] [ 2.161 ] [ 0.146 ] [ 0.025 ] [ 0.112 ] [ 0.103 ]
China -0.007 -0.097 0.122 0.020 -0.014 0.017
[ 0.009 ] [ 1.440 ] [ 0.245 ] [ 0.036 ] [ 0.155 ] [ 0.112 ]
Colombia -0.020 2.524 0.078 -0.018 0.097 0.163
[ 0.011 ] [ 1.987 ] [ 0.246 ] [ 0.031 ] [ 0.147 ] [ 0.088 ]
Hungary -0.040 10.441 0.026 -0.025 -0.078 0.078
[ 0.026 ] [ 2.025 ] [ 0.255 ] [ 0.052 ] [ 0.234 ] [ 0.142 ]
India -0.019 3.254 0.082 -0.008 -0.080 -0.036
[ 0.010 ] [ 1.255 ] [ 0.219 ] [ 0.030 ] [ 0.107 ] [ 0.140 ]
Indonesia -0.033 7.130 0.206 0.024 0.217 0.107
[ 0.023 ] [ 1.814 ] [ 0.291 ] [ 0.060 ] [ 0.224 ] [ 0.137 ]
Malaysia -0.015 2.789 0.056 -0.009 0.018 0.042
[ 0.009 ] [ 0.836 ] [ 0.160 ] [ 0.016 ] [ 0.108 ] [ 0.066 ]
Mexico -0.027 6.651 -0.136 -0.040 0.014 -0.050
[ 0.018 ] [ 2.073 ] [ 0.404 ] [ 0.043 ] [ 0.311 ] [ 0.180 ]
Peru -0.020 4.721 0.044 -0.011 0.045 -0.024
[ 0.010 ] [ 1.194 ] [ 0.186 ] [ 0.030 ] [ 0.100 ] [ 0.112 ]
Philippines -0.018 4.522 -0.112 -0.030 0.203 0.052
[ 0.012 ] [ 1.694 ] [ 0.282 ] [ 0.023 ] [ 0.084 ] [ 0.190 ]
Poland -0.036 10.913 -0.104 -0.012 0.043 0.028
[ 0.018 ] [ 1.078 ] [ 0.209 ] [ 0.032 ] [ 0.113 ] [ 0.088 ]
Romania -0.021 4.372 0.046 -0.003 0.120 0.110
[ 0.008 ] [ 0.230 ] [ 0.237 ] [ 0.025 ] [ 0.138 ] [ 0.062 ]
Russia -0.044 9.736 0.303 0.015 0.148 0.127
[ 0.046 ] [ 6.756 ] [ 0.998 ] [ 0.110 ] [ 0.898 ] [ 0.563 ]
South Africa -0.049 10.959 -0.138 -0.034 0.082 0.007
[ 0.022 ] [ 3.084 ] [ 0.396 ] [ 0.042 ] [ 0.190 ] [ 0.139 ]
Turkey -0.040 27.355 -0.074 -0.025 -0.080 -0.020
[ 0.016 ] [ 4.258 ] [ 0.364 ] [ 0.038 ] [ 0.203 ] [ 0.171 ]
Notes: In this table we report the averages of the quarterly estimates of the coefficients from the conditional quantile regressions
used to estimate the ∆CoV aR1%. The quarterly estimates are based on a 1-year rolling window of daily log returns on local
currency bond returns. The first sample period is 31/12/2003–30/6/2016. The ∆CoV aR1% are estimated using as conditioning
variables the log returns on the following indices: the S&P500, a U.S. corporate bond index, the CBOE VIX, and a commodity
index. In brackets we report bootstrap standard errors. Data are from Datastream.
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A Estimation of ∆CoV aRq
In order to estimate the conditional ∆CoV aRq we follow the algorithm described in Fong and
Wong (2012, 2011), which is itself based on the general model in Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016). We use the quantreg Matlab function written by Aslak Grinsted (2008) for the
quantile regression estimation. First, we convert local currency log returns in U.S. dollars.
Second, every quarter starting with 2003:Q1 and ending om 2016:Q3, we estimate ∆CoV aRq
over a 1-year rolling window of daily past log returns. When, for a given country and
window, we have missing values for the returns on the local currency bond index, we follow
the rule of estimating the ∆CoV aRq only if at least 1/3 of the observations in the window
are available. We construct returns on the aggregate market for local currency bonds as a
weighted average of country-level returns, where the weights are obtained by dividing the
country-GDP (converted in U.S. dollars) by the aggregate GDP of the countries in the sample
(converted in U.S. dollars). By construction, the weights sum up to 1. Results are robust to
using weights based on relative stock of local currency debt (converted in U.S. dollars). The
conditional variables are lagged by one period.
B Robustness Checks
In this section we show several robustness checks with respect to the results presented in
section 4. First, we repeat the estimation of the conditional ∆CoV aR1% using returns
expressed in local currency, as opposed to local currency returns converted in U.S. dollars.
Second, we check whether results are robust to a higher value for q = 5%.
B.I Panel Estimation with Returns in Local Currency
We repeat the estimation of ∆CoV aR1% described in section 4 using log returns expressed in
local currency (i.e., ri,? from equation (6)). Figure A1 plots the time series of the quarterly
estimates for ∆CoV aR1% for the countries in the sample. We report the results of the panel
estimation in table A1. Results are similar to those of table 5, with the main difference
being the magnitude of the coefficient attached to the foreign holdings of local currency debt
which is now smaller (in absolute value). Also in this case, all the other variables are not
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels.
B.II Panel Estimation with q = 5%
We repeat the estimation of ∆CoV aRq described in section 4 using a higher value of q = 5%.
Also in this case, the coefficient attached to the foreign holdings of local currency government
debt is negative and significant at the 15 percent confidence level.
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Figure A1: ∆CoV aR 1%
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Notes: This figure plots the quarterly estimates of the ∆CoV aR1% for all the countries in the sample using directly the returns
on the local currency bond indices expressed in local currency. The sample period is 31/12/2003–30/06/2016, or the longest
available for countries included in the J.P. Morgan indices at a later date. The ∆CoV aR are estimated using as conditioning
variables the returns on the S&P500, a U.S. corporate bond index, the CBOE VIX, and a commodity index. Data are from
Datastream.
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